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MAKING THE INDIGENT PAY TO OBTAIN
OUT-OF-STATE WITNESSES
The indigent criminal defendant has always been faced with the problem
of obtaining witnesses to testify in his behalf, particularly if his wit-
nesses are not present in the state where he is being tried. The Uniform
Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Crim-
inal Proceedings' seemed to solve this problem for the indigent defendant
after the great majority of states adopted it, and particularly after the
Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality.' This Act provides that a wit-
ness may be subpoenaed to testify in a criminal case or grand jury proceed-
ing from any other state having a reciprocal statute. The defendant must
show that the witness is material, and the witness must be tendered five
dollars for each day he is required to attend and ten cents for each mile
he must travel to and from the court.'
1 Hereinafter referred to as the Act. The Act has been adopted in 45 states and Puerto
Rico; ALASKA STAT. tit. 12, §12.50.010; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-1861; ARK. STAT.
ANN. §43-2005; CAL. PEN. CODE §1334; COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §39-6-1; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§54-22; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §3521; FLA. STAT. ANN. §942.01; IDAHO CODE ANN. §19-3005;
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §690.1; IND. ANN. STAT. §9-1626; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §62-2801; Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §421.230; LA. REV. STAT. §15.152.1; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1411; MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, §617; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, §13(a); MINN. STAT. ANN. §634.06; Miss.
CODE ANN. §1892; Mo. ANN. STAT. §491.400 (Cum Supp. 1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§94-9001; NEB. REV. STAT. §29-1906; NEV. REV. STAT. §178.295; N. H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§613.1; N. J. STAT. ANN. §2A: 81-18; N. M. STAT. ANN. §41-12-13; N. Y. CODE CRIe. PROC.
§618(a); N. C. GEN. STAT. §8-65; N. D. CENT. CODE ANN. §31-03-25; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§2939.26; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §721 (Supp. 1959); ORE. REV. STAT. §139.210; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, §622.1; P. R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34, §1471; R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §12-16-1; S. C. CODE
§26-301; S. D. CODE §34.2501; TENN. CODE ANN. §40-2429; TEX. CODE CRIVe. PROC. ANN. art.
24.28; UTAH CODE ANN. §77-45-11; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §6641; VA. CODE ANN. §19-242;
WASH. REV. CODE §10.55.010; W. VA. CODE ANN. §6246(1); WIS. STAT. ANN. §325.33; Wyo.
COMP. STAT. ANN. §7-250. For a comprehensive annotation on all phases of the Act, see 44
A.L.R.2d 732.
2 New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1958).
3 UNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT A STATE IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS §3, 9 U.L.A. 91 (1957): "If a person in any state, which by its laws
has made provision for commanding persons within its borders to attend and testify in crim-
inal prosecutions, or grand jury investigations commenced or about to commence, in this state,
is a material witness in a prosecution pending in a court of record in this state, or in a grand
jury investigation which has commenced or is about to commence, a judge of such court may
issue a certificate under the seal of the court stating these facts and specifying the number of
days the witness will be required. Said certificate may include a recommendation that the wit-
ness be taken into immediate custody and delivered to an officer of this state to assure his
attendance in this state. This certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court of record in
the county in which the witness is found.
If the witness is summoned to attend and testify in this state he shall be tendered the sum
of ten cents a mile for each mile by the ordinary traveled route to and from the court where
the prosecution is pending and five dollars for each day that he is required to travel and at-
tend as a witness. A witness who has appeared in accordance with the provisions of the sum-
mons shall not be required to remain within this state a longer period of time than the period
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However, because of the interpretations given the Act by the courts,
the indigent defendant is still a long way from the protection the Act
seemed to promise him. The basic problem is that the courts seem to re-
quire a defendant to pay the expenses of witnesses subpoenaed for him
under the Act, even though he may be indigent.
I
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACT
Nevada was the first jurisdiction to pass on the problem. In State v.
Fouquette4 the court said in dictum that the Act conferred no authority
to subpoena defense witnesses at public expense. There the court stated,
[1]t is clear that this statute, providing, as it does, that specified sums
for fees and mileage shall be paid or tendered to non-resident witnesses
summoned to attend and testify in criminal prosecutions in this state,
but not providing, either expressly or by implication, that such witnesses
summoned on behalf of the defendant shall be brought in without ex-
pense to him, does not confer upon the courts of this state authority to
procure the attendance and testimony of witnesses from without the
state for the defendant in any case at the expense of the public.5
Only a constitutional compulsory process question was raised by the de-
fendant in this case, and the Act was not cited by him in his argument. The
court ruled that the subpoena was properly denied because the testimony
of the desired witnesses would have been incompetent and immaterial.
Also, the trial court had allowed the defendant to subpoena four out-of-
state witnesses at public expense; yet the Fouquette case has been heavily
relied on by other courts which have considered the question.6
One such case was State v. Blount,' where the defendant obtained an
order to secure an out-of-state witness under the Act. However, he alleged
that he could not compel the witness' attendance, because he was desti-
tute and could not tender the necessary expenses. The trial court refused
to order public funds for this purpose, and the Oregon Supreme Court up-
held the ruling. Dismissing the defendant's claim of indigency by saying
mentioned in the certificate, unless ordered by the court. If such witness, after coming into
this state, fails without good cause to attend and testify as directed in the summons, he shall
be punished in the manner provided for the punishment of any witness who disobeys a sum-
mons issued from a court of record in this state."
There are some variations in the Act in different states. Some states, for example, allow a
larger per diem amount for expenses than others.
4 67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d 404 (1950).
5 Id. 221 P.2d at 410.
6 State v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 264 P.2d 419 (1953) ; Vore v. State, 158 Neb. 222, 63 N.W.
2d 141 (1954) ; State ex rel. Butler v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 24, 66 N.W.2d 1 (1954); State v.
Hemmenway, 80 S.D. 153, 120 N.W.2d 561 (1963).
7 State v. Blount, supra note 6.
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that there was no such showing when the order was made, the court held
that there was no authority under the Act to secure defense witnesses at
public expense because, although the Act requires that the witness be ten-
dered mileage and expenses, it is silent as to the source of the money.8 The
court also stated that there was no authority under the Act to expend any
funds in advance,9 although it seems that a witness is not required to at-
tend unless he is first tendered these fees. Finally, the court felt that Ore-
gon law, which allowed defendants to have witnesses within the state
subpoenaed at public expense, did not establish a public policy of using
county funds to secure out-of-state defense witnesses."
A similar decision in Vore v. State" declared that the authority to pay
defendant's witness fees must arise from an express provision of a statute
and not by implication.
The issue of an indigent defendant was squarely met in State ex rel.
Butler v. Swenson and State v. Hemmenway, 2 where the defendants were
represented by appointed counsel. In both cases it was decided that the
court lacked authority under the Act to provide defendants with out-of-
state witnesses at public expense, and no special consideration was given
the defendants because of their indigency.
As an example of the extent to which courts have gone in misconstru-
ing the statute, State v. Lupino'5 held that the Act did not impose upon the
state any obligation to procure for the defendant out-of-state witnesses
because they are beyond the reach of the state's process. The court modi-
fied its statement somewhat by saying that it assumed that arrangements
to secure vital defense witnesses from outside the state would be made if
this could be done with "reasonable facility,"' 4 but this did not prevent
the ruling from being clearly erroneous. The holding was based on the
theory that the only purpose of the Act is to enable the prosecution to
secure witnesses. The Act certainly has that effect, but there is no reason
to deny its effect to defense witnesses as well. The Act makes no differen-
tiation between. prosecution and defense witnesses but applies to "any
person... (who) is a material witness" and defines a witness as a "person
whose testimony is desired in any proceeding or investigation by a Grand
8 Id. 264 P.2d at 424.
9 Id. 264 P.2d at 425. Note that the California judge refused to order the witness to at-
tend in Oregon unless the expenses were forthcoming in advance.
10 Id. 264 P.2d at 424.
11158 Neb. 222, 63 N.W.2d 141 (1954).
12 State ex rel. Butler v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 24, 66 N.W.2d 1 (1954); State v. Hemmen-
way, 80 S.D. 153, 120 N.W.2d 561 (1963).
13 State v. Lupino, 268 Minn. 344, 129 N.W.2d 294 (1964). The defendant asked for the
presence of two witnesses. One was an inmate of the federal prison at Alcatraz, California,
and therefore would not seem subject to the Act. Tlhe other, however, was in South Carolina,
which has passed the Act. S.C. CODE §26-301.
14 Ibid.
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Jury or in a Criminal Action, Prosecution, or Proceeding." 1 The Lupino
ruling flies directly in the face of the clear and obvious meaning of the
statute, and other authority is contrary to its holding. 6
II
CLEAR INTENT OF THE ACT
The mandate of the Act seems clear. It states that material witnesses in
criminal proceedings can be compelled to attend from another state by
court order and provides that they must be paid mileage and per diem
expenses. No distinction is made between prosecution and defense wit-
nesses. Therefore, the clear and reasonable interpretation of the statute
is that the state or county will pay all necessary expenses under the Act,
whther for the prosecution or defense, and whether the defendant is indi-
gent or not.
There is some logic, however, in an argument that the Act should not
require a state to bear witness expenses for a defendant who is fully able
to pay them. But this logic fails in the case of the indigent accused. To say
that the Act requires a defendant to pay the necessary expenses of securing
absent witnesses is one thing; but to say that under it a defendant without
any money can secure out-of-state witnesses only if he pays for them is to
give the Act a cruelly absurd meaning. It should be obvious that this is not
the intent of the statute.
The clearest reading of the statute, then, is that the Act provides for
the summoning of absent witnesses for all defendants, with no distinction
being made between those with adequate means and those without ade-
quate means. Even if this proposition is denied by the courts, it is difficult
to see how the Act does not provide for public funds in the case of the
indigent defendant. The Act requires that the witnesses be paid; and if an
accused is indigent, who but the state is to pay them? It is certainly attrib-
uting an unreasonable meaning to the statute to say that it requires the
defendant to pay in such a situation.
In the Blount case, discussed supra,7 three justices, while concurring
in the result, argued that the Act does confer authority on the court to use
public funds to secure the presence of witnesses for the defense:
15 UNFORM ACT TO SECURE TuE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT THE STATE IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS §§1, 3, 9 U.L.A. 91 (1957).
16 WITKIN, CALrFRNIA EVIDENCE §752 at 704 (2d ed. 1966): "The statute, while doubtless
intended chiefly for the use of prosecuting officials, seems clearly available to the defendant as
well." 44 A.L.R.2d 732, 733: "The act applies both to witnesses sought by the state and wit-
nesses sought by the defendant in the criminal case." In re Cooper, 127 N.J.L. 312, 33 A.2d 532
(1941).
17 State v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 264 P.2d 419 (1953).
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A poor man, who was unable to advance his witness' expenses, might be
convicted although innocent, or a guilty man might go free, and the
Uniform Act would indeed be emasculated, if not totally destroyed.' 8
The same justices also pointed out that since a witness is not required to
attend unless he has been tendered the statutory expenses, there must be
authority to order these expenses in advance:
If there is no power vested in the court to order the payment of wit-
nesses' expenses in advance in order to force the attendance of an un-
willing witness- then in the name of reason, what good is the act? 19
It should be mentioned here that because of the requirement of materiality
there is very little danger that defendants will abuse the act by demanding
that large numbers of unnecessary witnesses be secured at public expense.
As long as the defendant is obliged to show that the testimony of his de-
sired witnesses will be material, he cannot place an undue burden on the
public treasury.
III
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL INTERPRETATIONS
The picture is not all black for the indigent criminal defendant, however.
California, which has adopted the Act as part of its Penal Code,2 ° solves
the problem by declaring in another statute2 ' that sums required by law
to be paid to witnesses in criminal cases are county charges. This would
seem to be true whether or not the defendant could afford to pay.
The California case of People v. Newville22 supports this contention.
Although the defendant's request for a subpoena to compel the attendance
of witnesses absent from California was denied because there was no show-
ing that the testimony of the witnesses was material, the court did not
quarrel with the idea that the county would have to pay the expenses were
the defendant's motion granted. Indeed, the trial court stated:
Certainly, before I would issue any order for the expenditure of countyfunds in the amount that is going to be necessary in this case, I would
want to know definitely that the testimony would be material and forth-
coming.23
In the Federal courts an indigent defendant can also obtain necessary wit-
nesses by subpoena at government expense, although the trial court has
wide discretion in the matter. As in state tribunals, the accused must show
18 Id. at 431 (Latourette, C. J., specially concurring).
19 Id. at 430 (Latourette, C. J., specially concurring. Emphasis added).
20 CAL. PEN CODE §§1334-1334.6.
21 CAL. GOVT. CODE §29603.
22 People v. Newville, 220 Cal.App.2d 267, 33 Cal.Rptr. 816 (1963).
23 Id. at 275, 33 Cal.Rptr. at 821.
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that the expected testimony is material and that he cannot go to trial safely
without it.24
IV
CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, it is possible that many jurisdictions do furnish the
defense with out-of-state witnesses at the expense of the county or state
and that no appellate decision has been necessary to rule on this issue.
However, all reported judicial decisions, aside from those of California,
have been against the accused in this respect. It seems that an indigent
defendant will find the Act of little use until legislatures spell out for the
courts the proposition that an indigent defendant cannot be expected to
pay his witnesses' expenses. Joseph Tinney
2 4 FED. R. CIu. P. 17(b).
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